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Introduction
A predominant characteristic of U.S. macroeco-
nomic developments in the 1980s was the simulta-
neous emergence of large federal budget deficits
and unprecedented international trade deficits.
Many economists, relying on open-economy vari-
ants of the standard income-expenditure model,
have linked these deficits in a causal chain that
also ties them to high U.S. interest rates and to the
dollar's appreciation earlier in the decade (see
Hutchison and Pigott [1984]). The description
has now become part of popular economic lore,
but as is often the case with legend or myth,
many of the intricacies of and important quali-
fications to a fundamentally plausible story have
been lost in its common transmittal. Moreover, a
paucity of hard empirical support for the simple
and direct relationship offered by this popular
view has done little to curtail its telling.
1
This paper acknowledges that fiscal policies
can create trade deficits, but argues that this need
not be the case and typically has not been the case
• 1 The popular accounts derive from the open-economy version of
the income-expenditure (or Keynesian) model. Frenkel and Razin (1987,
part II) offer an unabridged account of this model.
in the United States. Section I offers a simplified
version of the two-period, representative-agent
model found in Frenkel and Razin (1987).
2 Un-
like the standard income-expenditure approach,
this model does not assign a predominantly
causal role to government budget deficits, but it
does allow that, under certain circumstances, fis-
cal policies can influence the trade balance, real
interest rates, and real exchange rates. The out-
come depends on how the government's propen-
sities to import and to consume out of current
income compare with those of the private sector,
and on the distortionary effects of taxes.
Section II offers an empirical investigation of
U.S. fiscal policy during the floating-exchange-
rate period, using Engle-Granger (1987) co-
integration techniques. The empirical tests
search for common long-run trends between
economic variables suggested by the theoretical
analysis and aggregate measures of U.S. federal
fiscal policy. The results do not support the
common contention of simple, direct relation-
ships among these measures and U.S. trade
balances, interest rates, or exchange rates. As
2 See also Aschauer (1985), Hill (1990), and Koenig (1989).noted in the concluding section, however, such
tests are subject to important qualifications and
do not preclude the possibility of short-term
relationships.
I. A Simple Model
A nation running a current account deficit absorbs
more real economic resources than it produces. Its
citizens accommodate differences between their
desired consumption and production by purchas-
ing additional goods from abroad, and they fi-
nance their activity by borrowing in world money
markets. Because government spending and tax
policies affect consumption and production deci-
sions, a nation's fiscal policies can strongly influ-
ence its international trade patterns.
Frenkel and Razin (1987) show that the rela-
tionship is often similar to that described in in-
ternational economics as the transfer problem.
Because fiscal policies typically involve a trans-
fer of funds from the private sector to the gov-
ernment sector, their international implications
depend on a comparison of both the govern-
ment's and the private sector's propensities to
save and to import. Moreover, when govern-
ment activities are deficit financed, the outcomes
depend more on the existence of tax distortions
than on public borrowing per se. Following
Frenkel and Razin, this section develops a sim-
ple model to illustrate these points. To appre-
ciate the argument, however, one must first
understand the motives for international trade




Consider a hypothetical economy consisting of
two countries (home and rest-of-world), each
possessing and consuming quantities of two
goods over two time periods. Each country con-
sists of a single representative consumer and a
government, which taxes and spends. Assume
that no production takes place, but that both
countries start each time period with a specific
endowment of the two goods.
Let a single consumer with homothetic prefer-
ences represent each country.
3 Each consumer
maximizes utility over two periods, subject to the
constraint that the present value of private inter-
temporal consumption equals the present value






Here, Ct refers to private after-tax consumption
in time t{= 0,1), such that
Ct=cxt+pc
ml,
where cx t and cm t represent consumption of
goods X and M in specific time periods. The terms
of trade, p, expresses units of M in terms of units of
X, p" is a subjective discount factor applied to fu-
ture utility, and rx is the real interest rate. I express
each in terms of good X, but the following arbitrage
condition makes measurement arbitrary:
(4)
With two goods and two time periods, how-
ever, unanticipated changes in the terms of
trade within any period can affect intertemporal
decisions. The Tt terms represent lump-sum
taxes, whereas the tt terms are tax rates applied
to private consumption.
At the beginning of each period, consumers
receive an endowment, Yt, of the two goods,
such that
(5) Yt=qxt+pqml,
where qu(i=x, m) refers to quantities of the
two goods, X and M. I assume that consumers
seek to smooth consumption over the two
periods by borrowing or lending through inter-
national credit markets.
The government uses tax revenue to finance
expenditures, Gt, subject to the constraint that
the present discounted value of government ex-
penditures over the two periods equals the
present discounted value of tax revenue:
• 3 Homothetic preferences are such that, for constant relative prices,
any given percentage change in income results in the same percentage
change in the consumption of all goods. Homothetic preferences cause the
income expansion curves in figures 1 through 5 to be straight lines. 4 For a discussion, see Frenkel and Razin (1987), pp. 168-71.FIGURE 1
Optimization over Time and
the Trade Deficit
SOURCE: Author.
(6) • - To+ t0C0
(l + rx) (1 + rJ-
Solvency requires that the government retire
any budget deficit incurred in the first period
during the second period.
For each nation as a whole, the first-period
budget constraint is
(7)
Any nation can absorb, through private con-
sumption and government spending, more or
less than its current endowment, as equation (5)
shows, but if it absorbs more than its endow-
ment, the nation must borrow (Bo > 0), and if it
consumes less, it will lend the excess (Bo < 0).
The second-period budget constraint is given by
(8)
Since this model contains only two periods,
each country must retire any first-period debts
in the second period. Therefore, solvency re-
quires that over the two periods,
(9)
over the two periods must equal the present
value of the endowments. The trade account
must balance, and the countries must extinguish
all international debts.
Equation (1) assumes that utility is intertempo-
rally separable. Each consumer desires an optimal
expenditure over the two periods. Within each
period, the consumer chooses an optimal con-
sumption bundle of the two goods, one that maxi-
mizes Ut. Although this choice is constrained by
the overall level of expenditure within a period
and by relative prices, the choice of a consump-
tion bundle in any period is otherwise independ-
ent of the choice in any other period.
Intertemporal
Consumption
Assuming no government sector for the moment,
the representative individual allocates his con-




Accordingly, the present value of private after-
tax consumption plus government spending
where Ut is the marginal utility derived from
consumption in period t. The first term in equa-
tion (10), the consumer's marginal rate of substi-
tution between present and future consumption,
measures his willingness to trade current for fu-
ture consumption. The higher his subjective dis-
count factor, the more the consumer prefers
present to future consumption. The second
term, one plus the real interest rate, is the inter-
temporal terms of trade—the market terms at
which a consumer can trade current for future
consumption. As equation (10) indicates, the
utility-maximizing consumer will allocate his
consumption over the two periods until his will-
ingness to substitute between them equals the
terms offered for this exchange in the market. If
at any time this condition is not met, an exchange
of resources can enhance the consumer's utility.
In figure 1, this maximization process is illus-
trated with an Edgeworth-box diagram, which
shows the home country's origin in the lower left
corner and the foreign country's origin in the
upper right corner. (An asterisk designates foreign
variables.) The utility curves I and II show, for a
given level of utility, the willingness of the home
country and the rest of the world to trade current
for future consumption.
5 The ray extending from
each origin, the income expansion path, shows
• 5 See also Hill (1990) and Koenig (1989).FIGURE 2
Optimization across Goods
and Trade at Time t
SOURCE: Author.
the respective country's optimal level of con-
sumption for changing levels of income and a
fixed real interest rate. The slopes of these two
rays indicate that the home country prefers cur-
rent consumption relatively more than does the
foreign country.
Point A, at the center of the diagram, marks
initial endowments and shows that each coun-
try receives equal consumption bundles in each
period, Yt= Y* (t = 0,1). At point A, however,
the countries' subjective temporal preferences
for consumption differ. The home country val-
ues present consumption more highly than does
the foreign country. Consequently, both can in-
crease their utility by agreeing to trade at some
rate of intertemporal exchange passing within
the ellipse formed by their utility curves. The
line passing through points A and E, whose
slope is - (1 + rx), is one such rate of exchange.
Given the real interest rate rx, the nations will
trade to point E, at which the conditions for op-
timal consumption, given by equation (10),
hold. The home country now consumes more
than its initial endowment in the first period,
running a trade deficit, Bo, but it will run a
surplus, (1 + rx) BQ , in the second period. At point
E, each country is on a higher utility curve than at
point A. In fact, point E is a Pareto optimum; no




After allocating consumption across time, each
representative consumer will choose quantities
of the two goods that maximize utility at each
point in time. Consumers will choose among
the two goods X and M until
(ID = p-
6 The home and foreign countries will negotiate the optimal interest
rate.
The term on the left side of equation (11) gives
the marginal rate of substitution, the rate at
which each consumer is willing to substitute be-
tween goods X and M. The term on the right
side is the market-based relative price of the
two goods, or the temporal terms of trade. If
during any time period the condition depicted
in equation (11) is not fulfilled, an opportunity
exists for welfare-enhancing trade.
I again illustrate the maximization process by
reproducing the Edgeworth box in figure 2 with
appropriate changes in the axis and in the terms-
of-trade line. I depict the home country as favor-
ing consumption of good M, the importable good.
At the initial endowment point, A, the home coun-
try values consumption of this good more than
does the foreign country, and both countries can
gain from exchange along the terms-of-trade line
(with slope -p) to point E, where the condition
given in equation (11) holds. At point E, the home
country consumes the importable good in excess
of its initial endowment, but it consumes less than
its initial endowment of the exportable good.
Nature of Trade and
Trade Deficits
Despite the simplicity of the model, figures 1 and
2 offer important insights into the nature of inter-
national trade and the causes of trade imbalances.
Trade takes place in this model because of 1) dif-
ferences in nations' time preference for consump-
tion at the initial endowment point, or 2) differ-
ences in the relative preferences for the two goods
in any time period given endowments.
7
A trade imbalance results when a country
desires a consumption profile that differs from
its endowment profile. A country that consumes
more (less) than its current endowment will run
• 7 I do not include comparative advantage as a motive for trade,
despite its predominance in the literature, because the model does not in-
clude production.a trade deficit (surplus).
8 Changes in the real in-
terest rate act to clear the intertemporal imbal-
ance between endowments and consumption.
This suggests that factors that influence decisions
about intertemporal consumption—including
government policies—also affect the trade balance.
Hill (1989), for example, argues that a country's
demographic profile influences its trade balance
because younger households tend to save less
than older households.
Moreover, because this model specifies the
interest rate in terms of good X, and as a result
of the arbitrage condition (4), factors that cause
an unexpected change in the terms of trade can
also influence the interest rate, intertemporal
decisions, and the trade balance. The relation-
ship between changes in the terms of trade and
the trade balance depends on whether these
changes are permanent or temporary, on the ini-
tial position of the trade balance, and on the
parameters of the model (see Frenkel and Razin
[1987], pp. 176-82).
The analysis in figure 1 also helps to dispel
the notion that a trade deficit represents a state
of economic disequilibrium or a deterioration in
the economic well-being of the deficit country.
Instead, the model illustrates that both the sur-
plus and the deficit countries improve their
economic welfare by running trade imbalances.
A developing country, for example, might run a
trade deficit in order to acquire capital goods,
with the intention of eventually financing the
acquisition by running a trade surplus. Such
strategies are typically considered welfare en-
hancing.
Nevertheless, the figure does illustrate that
the deficit country must eventually finance its
debts though a reduction in future consump-
tion. In the comparative static model presented
here, the reduction is absolute. In a dynamic
model, with growing economies, any change in
future consumption is measured relative to where
it would have been in the absence of trade. In
such a model, it is not necessarily the case that a
trade deficit must lower future standards of living.
9
• 8 In the National Income and Product Accounts, gross national
product (GNP) equals consumption (C) plus investment (I) plus govern-
ment purchases (G) plus exports (X) minus imports (M): GNP = C +1 + G
+ X - M. Rearranging this expression, one obtains GNP - C -1 - G =
X - M, which shows the relationship between national savings on the left
side and the trade balance on the right side.




Much of the recent concern about U.S. fiscal
policy centers on the impact of federal budget
deficits on real interest rates, exchange rates,
and the trade balance. The theoretical analysis
of fiscal policy, therefore, begins by considering
the effects of deficit-financed tax reductions, in-
cluding 1) a lump-sum tax cut, and 2) a reduc-
tion in the tax rate on consumption.
Because many politicians and economists
favor a balanced-budget amendment, I next
consider the effects of balanced-budget fiscal
policies in the form of 1) temporary and per-
manent balanced-budget spending, and 2)
balanced-budget spending on the exportable
commodity. As we shall see, different types of
policies can have different combinations of ef-
fects on real interest rates, the terms of trade,
and the trade balance.
Deficit-Financed Cut
in Lump-Sum Taxes
With the introduction of taxes into the model,





In maximizing welfare, the representative con-
sumer now chooses an intertemporal consump-
tion pattern that equates his marginal rate of
substitution between current and future con-
sumption to intertemporal terms of trade that
include taxes on current and future consump-
tion as well as on real interest rates. As is well
known, lump-sum taxes in the consumer's bud-
get constraint (equation [2]) do not affect the
choice of the optimal consumption pattern, and
therefore will have no effect on real interest
rates or on the trade balance.
According to the principle of Ricardian
equivalence, the intertemporal path of private
consumption is invariant with respect to whether
the government finances a given level of expendi-
ture via lump-sum taxes or via borrowing. If
consumers understand that the issuance of gov-
ernment debt implies a future tax liability to retire
that debt, and if they also desire a smooth inter-
temporal consumption path, then a deficit-
financed cut in taxes will not cause them to




will save the additional purchasing power result-
ing from the tax cut in order to meet the future
tax liabilities associated with retiring the govern-
ment debt. The method of financing will, there-
fore, leave the interest rate unaffected.
The simple two-period model outlined
above incorporates Ricardian equivalence in
that the single representative agent must retire
any government debt in the second period. The
real-world application of Ricardian equivalence,
however, seems more problematic given that
taxes are distortionary, that the present genera-
tion might push the burden of retiring the debt
onto future generations, or that the tax cut redis-
tributes income to segments of the population
with high marginal propensities to consume,
while leaving the burden of servicing the debt






When I allow a deficit-financed reduction in
consumption taxes, equation (12) indicates that
it will distort that optimal intertemporal con-
sumption choice. This can be seen in figure 3,
which illustrates the effects of a deficit-inducing
reduction in taxes on current consumption.
• 10 For an empirical application to the twin deficit issue, see
Enders and Lee (1990).
Point A represents an initial equilibrium, at
which present and future taxes on consumption
are equal at home and abroad. Now consider a
temporary tax reduction on current domestic
consumption in time period 0. The line for tax-
adjusted intertemporal terms of trade for the
home country shifts from that designated as a
in figure 3 to that designated as p. (The foreign
country continues to face intertemporal terms of
trade given by line a.)
As the figure shows, the deficit-inducing tax
cut encourages current domestic consumption
and results in an excess demand for current out-
put given by (Co - Co). The real interest rate
will subsequently rise, causing the world terms-
of-trade line a to become steeper, until the
markets for current and future consumption
clear at a point such as E. Because at point E the
home country is consuming more than its initial
endowment, it runs a trade deficit amounting to
(CQ — Co). At point E, the home country con-
sumes less than its endowment of the future
goods, thereby running a trade surplus in
period 1, given by (C, - C\). Point E is also on
a lower indifference curve because the higher
interest reduces the present value of future in-
come. Although not shown, the foreign country
might share part of this effect.
At the new market-clearing point E, the tax
creates a distortion between the market intertem-
poral terms of trade, given by line a', which the
foreigner faces, and the tax-adjusted intertemporal
terms of trade, given by line p", which the home
country faces. The resulting lens between the two
utility curves, which pass through point E, repre-
sents the "welfare costs of the tax distortion.
1
1
Figure 3 shows that a deficit-inducing tax
reduction that encourages current consumption
over future consumption will raise the real interest
rate and create a trade deficit in the home country.
Although the model does not include production,
extrapolating from its underlying logic, one would
expect that a deficit-financed tax reduction (for ex-
ample, a payroll tax cut or a lower capital gains tax
that stimulated current production relative to cur-
rent consumption) could lower real interest rates
and generate a trade surplus.
As the model suggests, no simple relationship
exists among government budget deficits, real in-
terest rates, and the trade deficit. In comparing the
results of this section with those of the previous
one, I find that it is the distortionary nature of the
• 11 Although not drawn as such, the slope of line P' will be
higher than that of line p because of the rise in the world interest rate.FIGURE 4
Balanced-Budget Spending
on Current Output
° o ° o
 u o o
SOURCE: Author.
tax that is crucial and not the deficit per se (see





The preceding suggests that the relationships
among fiscal policy, real interest rates, and the
trade deficit depend on the distortionary nature
of taxes rather than on the use of deficit financ-
ing. This section extends the investigation by
considering balanced-budget spending meas-
ures. If the observed correlations between defi-
cits and the trade balance in the early 1980s
stemmed from specific tax and spending poli-
cies, then a balanced-budget amendment would
be of little avail in lowering real interest rates or
eliminating the trade deficit.
Assume that the economy is initially in equi-
librium with a balanced trade account. Point A
in figure 4, which is similar to figure 1 in its ini-
tial construction, depicts such a situation, with
the home country consuming Co in the current
period and C, in the future period. In equi-
librium at point A, the intertemporal terms of
trade are given by line / with slope - (1 + rx).
Now allow a temporary rise in home-country
government spending, financed entirely with
a lump-sum tax on the home-country con-
• 12 I do not consider taxes on specific commodities (such as
tariffs); they are a standard topic of trade theory.
sumers.
1
3 The model depicts this as an increase
in government spending on the current good
only. The government's fiscal action reduces the
amount of current output available for both
domestic and foreign private consumption,
which figure 4 shows as a shortening by Go in
the horizontal dimensions of the Edgeworth
box. Two other adjustments follow: First, for the
foreign country only, point A shifts to point A*,
where both current and future consumption are
unaffected by the home government's fiscal
policy. Second, because of the tax, To, home-
country consumption shifts from point A to
point B. (Notice that the horizontal distance
measured by TQ equals the horizontal distance
Go.) As its after-tax income falls, the home-
country private sector reduces its consumption
of both Co and Cx, but because individuals will
attempt to smooth consumption over both
periods, the reduction in current consumption
will not match the increase in the government's
current consumption.
Taking account of all of these initial effects in
figure 4, we see that balanced-budget government
spending initially creates an excess demand for
current output, designated by (C?o - C70 ), and an
excess supply of future output, designated by
(Cj — Cj). These imbalances will cause the real
interest rate to rise, increasing the attractiveness of
future private consumption relative to current
private consumption. Graphically, the rise in the
real interest rate will pivot the intertemporal terms-
of-trade line to a position such as that shown by I'
until a new equilibrium, as defined by equation
(10), obtains. Figure 4 shows such an equilibrium
at point E. Here, the home country records a
current-period trade deficit equal to (CQ - CQ ).
The model indicates that a temporary increase
in home-government, balanced-budget spending
reduces both domestic and foreign private con-
sumption and causes a home-country trade defi-
cit. Intertemporal aspects of these resource trans-
fers are accommodated through a rise in real
interest rates.
Extending the analysis to consider the effects
of a permanent increase in balanced-budget
spending helps to illustrate more clearly the na-
ture of the relationship between government
spending and the trade deficit. One can show
the effects of a permanent increase in govern-
ment spending in an Edgeworth-box diagram
by altering both its horizontal and vertical
dimensions. When both dimensions change,
• 13 Assume that the propensity of the government to spend on
goods Xand M exactly matches that of the private sector, so that the




however, many different configurations of
results are possible, depending on the propen-
sities of the government to spend on current
and future consumption (see Frenkel and Razin
[1987], pp. 195-98). If, for example, the govern-
ment's propensities to consume current and
future output exactly match those of the private
sector, as indicated by the slope of the diagonal
running from 0 to 0* in figure 4, then no trade
imbalance or change in real interest rates would
result from government spending. The equilib-
rium point would simply slide down the diago-
nal from A toward 0.
Frenkel and Razin argue that international re-
percussions of government spending are similar
to those typically discussed in the literature as the
transfer problem. Balanced-budget spending
transfers resources from the home-country private
sector to the government sector. If the home-
country government's intertemporal preference
for consumption differs from that of the private
sector, the transfer will alter the overall world equi-
librium for intertemporal consumption. If the over-
all propensity to spend on current output rises, as
depicted in figure 4, real interest rates will increase
and a home-country trade deficit may ensue.
Conversely, if the overall world propensity to con-
sume current output falls, real interest rates will
decline and the home country may experience a
trade surplus. According to the model, one must
know more to predict the effects than simply




The effects of government spending on a par-
ticular commodity within a specific time period
are analytically similar. Assume that the private
sector has obtained the optimal pattern of con-
sumption over both time periods and across
both goods. Figure 5 depicts the optimal domes-
tic and foreign private consumption of the ex-
portable and importable goods for a given time
period at point A. I assume that the government
has the same rate of time preference as does the
private sector.
The initial effects of government balanced-
budget spending on the export good are
depicted as shifting the initial foreign position
to point A' and as shifting the initial domestic
private-sector position to point B for reasons
paralleling those offered in the explanation of
the similar shift in figure 4. The tax and spend-
ing patterns then create an excess demand for
the export good given by (Xo - Xo) and create
an excess supply for the import good equal to
(Mo — Mo). The terms of trade will improve (the
relative price of the exportable good will rise)
until an equilibrium such as point E obtains.
The example outlined above is not a general
case. I have assumed that domestic and foreign
propensities to spend on the importable good
are exactly the same and less than one, but I
have set the government's propensity to spend
on this good at zero. Allowing the government
to spend on both the exportable and the import-
able good, additional outcomes are possible
and reasonable. Frenkel and Razin (1987, pp.
202-03) explain this, again following the argu-
ments that underlie the transfer problems. In
general, the terms of trade will deteriorate (im-
prove) if the government's propensity to import
exceeds (is less than) the home country's pro-
pensity to import. The terms of trade will be un-
changed when the propensities are exactly alike.
As noted earlier, with the interest rate defined
in terms of the exportable good, unanticipated
changes in the terms of trade can affect intertem-
poral decisions and, hence, the trade deficit. This




The simple theoretical model shows that fiscal
policy can be related to trade deficits, real interestrates, and real exchange rates, but that the con-
nection need not necessarily hold. Whether, as
is often asserted, a simple, direct relationship be-
tween U.S. fiscal policies and the U.S. trade
balance exists seems largely a matter for empiri-
cal analysis. Using Engle-Granger cointegration
techniques, this section tests for a long-term
relationship among various measures of U.S. fis-




looks for long-term relationships, one might
view this exercise as testing the effects of the
permanent component of fiscal policies.
Cointegration
Many macroeconomic time series are not sta-
tionary; that is, their mean, variance, and co-
variance can change over time. Intuitively, this
suggests that, given a random shock, these
series will move off to new time paths instead
of returning to their original ones. The presence
of nonstationarity can invalidate many standard
statistical techniques for hypothesis testing, mak-
ing it difficult to determine if two nonstationary
series, such as government spending and inter-
est rates, are related. Economists often model
time series as ARIMA (p, d, q) processes, where d
is the number of times the series must be differ-
enced to achieve stationarity.
1
5 For most economic
time series, d = 1. Economists refer to such series as
containing a unit root or as being integrated of
order 1, and designate such series 1(1).
Engle and Granger (1987) propose a method
by which one can determine whether two 1(1)
times series tend to move in tandem or drift apart
over time. In the former case, even though the in-
dividual series are nonstationary, their joint rela-
tionship is stationary. Engle and Granger refer to
such series as being cointegrated.
The Engle-Granger cointegration test is simi-
lar to the Dickey-Fuller (1979) test for unit roots.
One must perform the latter tests as a first step
in the cointegration test to see if the relevant
series are each 1(1), because time series that are
integrated of different orders generally are not
cointegrated. The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test in-
volves regressing a time-series variable Y on its
• 14 Boucher (1991) uses similar cointegration tests to study the
relationship between the nominal current account balance and a set ot
variables either related by virtue ot the savings-investment identity or
commonly held to "cause" the current account. Included among
Boucher's causal variables is the nominal federal budget deficit.
past value to see if the resulting coefficient is
equal to 1. As is common, I specify the DF test
with a constant and a time trend
(13) i^Po+Pjf+P^ + u,,
where ut is the error term.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis that
P2 = 1 indicates that Y is I (1). One calculates the
DF test statistic exactly like a standard t statistic,
but the DF statistic does not have a t distribution.
TSP version 4.20 provides critical values based
on the appropriate distribution. Fuller (1976,
table 8.5.2) also provides critical values.
The presence of serial correlation in the error
terms greatly weakens the power of the DF test,
but one can correct for serial correlation by aug-
menting the above specification with lagged
first differences of the dependent variable.
1
6
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is
(14)
1=0
where zt is the error term. The null hypothesis
remains the same: P2 = 1.
According to Engle and Granger, two 1(1)
time series, Y and X, are cointegrated if a linear
combination of these two variables is stationary.
Such a combination can be obtained from an or-
dinary least squares regression of Y on X,
called the cointegrating regression. In what fol-
lows, I consistently specify the cointegrating
regression to include a constant term (Po):
(15) y,= po+p2A-,+e,.
The error term, Et, from the cointegrating re-
gression is then a linear combination of X and
Y, and one can use the DF procedures to test
for a unit root in the error term. Following con-
vention, I specify the test as
p
06) e,= pie,_1 + X P^Ae,.,.!,
i = 0
including lagged first differences of the error
term when necessary to adjust for possible
serial correlation.
The null hypothesis is Pj = 1. Failure to reject
the null hypothesis indicates that the error term is
not stationary and that it tends to drift away from
its expected value, zero, over the sample period.
• 15 ARIMA (p ,d, (?) refers to Autoregressive Integrated Moving




10-year Treasury bill (LTR)
Trade balance:
Net exports of goods and
services (NEX)
Government deficit:















NOTE: All series are inflation adjusted. I deflated 177?, DEF, and FEXP using




























a = .01, DF = -4.09
a = .05, DF = -3.47
a = .10, DF = -3.16
NOTE: All variables are inflation adjusted. All series start in 1973:IVQ and end
in 1991:IIIQ. Dickey-Fuller tests include a constant and a time trend. Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller tests include four lagged first-differences of the depend-
ent variables, which shorten the estimation period by four quarters.
SOURCE: Author's calculations on TSP version 4.20.
This, in turn, implies that the two time series Y
and X do not share a common underlying trend;
they tend to drift apart over the sample period.
One can extend the approach to consider
cointegration among three or more time-series
variables, each of which is 1(1). In such a case,
one adds the additional variables to the right
side of the cointegrating regression (equation
[15]) and proceeds with the DF tests described
above. The test statistic, however, is sensitive to
the number of right-side variables (exclusive of
the constant) in the cointegrating equation. TSP
version 4.20 provides appropriate critical
values, based on work by MacKinnon (1990).
Causality is not an issue in cointegration
tests. Consequently, the designation of depend-
ent and independent variables for both bivariate
and multivariate tests is arbitrary. Often, how-
ever, the results are sensitive to the ordering of
the variables in the cointegrating regression.
One should test all possibilities.
Data
Most popular discussions of the international ram-
ifications of U.S. fiscal policy focus on the federal
budget deficit and federal spending, so my meas-
ures of fiscal policy exclude the state and local sec-
tors. I test for cointegration between either the
federal budget deficit (DEF), federal government
spending (FEXP), or federal government pur-
chases of goods and services (FPUR), and long-
term interest rates (LTR), the trade-weighted dollar
(TWD), and net exports of goods and services
(NEX). Box 1 describes the data sources.
Consistent with the theoretical analysis, all vari-
ables are in real, or inflation-adjusted, form. If an
individual series was unavailable in this form, I
deflated the nominal series with the Consumer
Price Index. I initially ran all tests from 1973:IVQ
through 1991:IHQ to include 74 observations, but
because augmented versions include four lagged
variables, the tests run from 1974:IVQ to 199LIIIQ
and include 70 observations.
Results
Because cointegration presumes that the series
under consideration are 1(1), table 1 shows the
results of applying DF and ADF tests to the indi-
vidual time series. All of the series except FEXP
and FPUR were serially correlated, so ADF tests
were appropriate in most cases. None of the re-
sults, after any necessary adjustments for serial
correlation, reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root. Cointegration is an appropriate way to pro-
ceed with these data.
Table 2 presents the results of bivariate
Engle-Granger cointegration tests. The first col-
umn lists the two relevant variables. The second
















a = .01, DF = -4.56
a = .05, DF = -3.92










NOTE: All variables are inflation adjusted. The first statistic in each pair is for
the regression of the first variable on the second. The second statistic in each
pair is for the regression of the second variable on the first. Because serial cor-
relation was present in nearly all cases, I conducted ADF tests with four lagged
first-differences of the dependent variables. In the few cases where serial cor-
relation was not present, using ADF tests did not change any conclusions
reached with a simple DF test.
SOURCE: Author's calculations on TSP version 4.20.
tistic in each set is for the cointegrating regres-
sion (equation [1]) of the first variable from
column 1 on the second variable, and the
second statistic is for the cointegrating regres-
sion of the second variable on the first variable.
Because serial correlation was a problem in
nearly every case, table 2 presents only the
results of the ADF test. In the few cases where
serial correlation was not present, using the
ADF tests did not alter any conclusions reached
with the DF test.
The bivariate results indicate that neither the
federal deficit (DEF) nor federal expenditures
(FEXP) nor federal purchases (FPUR) is cointe-
grated with real long-term interest rates (LTR),
with the real effective dollar exchange rate (TWD),
or with real net exports (NEX). Moreover, the re-
sults are robust to the designation of the depend-
ent variable in the cointegrating regression.
Table 3 presents the results of multivariate
cointegration tests. In these cases, I regressed
the first variable listed in the table (to the left of
the semicolon) on a constant and on the remain-
ing three variables. Because serial correlation
was again a problem in nearly all cases, I pre-
sent only the results for ADF tests. The tests find
no evidence of cointegration.
Interpretation of
Empirical Results
The empirical test found no evidence that the
U.S. trade balance, long-term U.S. interest rates,
and the real trade-weighted dollar have shared
a common trend with the U.S. federal budget
deficit or with alternative measures of federal
spending during the floating-exchange-rate
regime. Such results, of course, do not preclude
the existence of a relationship between fiscal
policies and these economic variables.
Cointegration tests search for a stationary
linear combination of hypothetically related vari-
ables. The inclusion of other variables could
reveal a linear combination that is stationary. I
did not, for example, include foreign variables,
such as interest rates. Moreover, I did not scale
the deficit relative to GNP, as many researchers
do, nor have I attempted to take direct account
of the level of public debt. Deficit-financed fis-
cal policies, when the level of public debt is
very high, could have substantially different ef-
fects on real interest rates, exchange rates, and
the trade balance than would similar policies at
a low level of public borrowing. Similarly, the
relationship between fiscal policy measures and
the trade deficit might not be linear, and a linear
approximation of that relationship might fail to
show any connection at all. For these reasons,
cointegration tests of times series may be sensi-
tive to the time period investigated.
Although cointegration tests reveal long-term
relationships among the hypothetically related
variables, they may not find a shorter-term re-
lationship. I have interpreted the cointegration
tests as measuring the effects of the permanent
components of U.S. fiscal policies. The tempo-
rary aspects, as the theoretical model shows,
can have different and profound effects on im-
portant economic variables. Boucher (1991), for
example, concludes that nominal U.S. current
accounts and nominal U.S. government budget
deficits are not cointegrated, but using Granger
causality tests, she finds evidence that U.S.
government budget deficits do help to predict
current account deficits. Similarly, Abell (1990)
considers the twin deficit relationship in a VAR
model estimated strictly over the period of the
dollar's rapid appreciation: February 1979 to
February 1985. Although he does not find that
budget deficits Granger-cause trade deficits







DEF; LTR, TWD, NEX
LTR; TWD, NEX, DEF
TWD; NEX, DEF, LTR
NEX; DEF, LTR, TWD
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FPUR; LTR, TWD, NEX
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NEX; FPUR, LTR, TWD
Critical values for:
a = .01, DF = -5.29
a = .05, DF = -4.63













NOTE: All variables are inflation adjusted. Because serial correlation was pres-
ent in nearly all cases, I conducted ADF tests with four lagged first-differences
of the dependent variables. In the few cases where serial correlation was not
present, using ADF tests did not change any conclusions reached with a
simple DF test.
SOURCE: Author's calculations on TSP version 4.20.
affect interest rates, which then influence ex-
change rates, which then alter the trade bal-
ances.
 1
7 Hence, one should interpret the results
here as a general conclusion about the relation-
ship between federal fiscal policies and the trade
deficit during the period of floating exchange
rates, rather than as a comment on fiscal policy
over a subperiod, such as the early 1980s, or as a
prediction about possible future effects of U.S. fis-
cal policies.
• 17 Because of the enormous volume of empirical studies on the
relationships among measures of fiscal policy and interest rates, ex-
change rates, and the trade deficit, I do not survey the literature. The over-
whelming conclusion from even a cursory review is that the results are
mixed, with no clear pattern as to the source of the differences among the
studies. In addition to articles cited in the text, other avenues for pursuing
the empirical literature are the following: For results from large structural
models, see Hooper and Mann (1987) and Throop (1989a, 1989b). For
articles using VAR techniques, see Darrat (1988) and Rosensweig and
Tallman (1991). For some cross-country results, see Bernheim (1988)
and Laney (1984). For a look at deficits and interest rates, see Evans
(1985) and Hoelscher (1986). On deficits and exchange rates, see Evans
(1986) and Hutchison and Throop (1985).
III. Conclusion
This paper challenges the commonly held belief
that aggregate U.S. fiscal policy measures, notably
the federal budget deficit, bear a simple and direct
causal relationship with U.S. trade deficits in par-
ticular, and with U.S. interest rates and exchange
rates. The simple two-period, two-country models
developed here from earlier work by Frenkel and
Razin (1987) illustrate a complex relationship that
is dependent, in terms of both degree and
direction, on the distortionary nature of taxes
and on relative differences between public and
private propensities to consume and to import.
Although fiscal policies and the trade balance
can be related, they need not be.
The Engle-Granger cointegration tests, which
this paper employs, find no evidence of a long-
term relationship between common aggregate
measures of U.S. fiscal policy and real long-term
interest rates, real dollar exchange rates, and
real net exports. This does not mean that the
large U.S. federal budget deficits of the 1980s
did not contribute to the sharp deterioration of
U.S. trade in the early 1980s; nor does it imply
that a rising federal deficit in the 1990s will not
prevent further improvements in the U.S. trade
balance. The findings, however, do serve to
strengthen my main proposition, that the com-
mon story about the simple and direct relation-
ship between federal fiscal policies and the
trade balance is largely economic folklore.
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